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Self-contamination during doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE) is a 37 
concern for healthcare workers (HCW) following SARS-CoV-2 positive patient care. 38 
Staff may subconsciously become contaminated through improper glove removal, 39 
so quantifying this exposure is critical for safe working procedures. HCW surface 40 
contact sequences on a respiratory ward were modelled using a discrete-time 41 
Markov chain for: IV-drip care, blood pressure monitoring and doctors’ rounds. 42 
Accretion of viral RNA on gloves during care was modelled using a stochastic 43 
recurrence relation. In the simulation, the HCW then doffed PPE and contaminated 44 
themselves in a fraction of cases based on increasing case load.  A parametric 45 
study was conducted to analyse the effect of: 1a) increasing patient numbers on 46 
the ward, 1b) the proportion of COVID-19 cases, 2) the length of a shift and 3) the 47 
probability of touching contaminated PPE. The driving factors for exposure  were 48 
surface contamination and number of surface contacts. Results simulate generally 49 
low viral exposures in most of the scenarios considered including on 100% COVID-19 50 
positive wards although this is where the highest self-inoculated dose is likely to 51 
occur with median 0.0305 viruses (95% CI=0-0.6 viruses). Dose correlates highly with 52 
surface contamination showing that this can be a determining factor for exposure. 53 
The infection risk resulting from exposure is challenging to estimate as it will be 54 
influenced by factors such as virus variant and vaccination rates. 55 
 56 
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Practical Implications 60 
Infection risk from self-contamination during doffing PPE is an important concern in 61 
healthcare settings, especially on a COVID-19 ward. Fatigue during high workload 62 
shifts may result in increased frequency of mistakes and hence risk of exposure. 63 
Length of staff shift and number of COVID-19 patients on a ward correlate positively 64 
with the risk to staff through self-contamination after doffing. Cleaning of far-patient 65 
surfaces is equally important as cleaning traditional “high-touch surfaces”, given 66 
that there is an additional risk from bioaerosol deposition outside the patient zone.  67 








Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is an enveloped 70 
virus which has infected in excess of 200 million people to date and caused more 71 
than four million deaths worldwide according to Johns Hopkins University’s COVID-19 72 
Dashboard (1). Inanimate objects known as fomites may host pathogens and have 73 
the potential to contribute to transmission in healthcare environments. This occurs in 74 
viral contamination spread (2–4) including SARS-CoV-2 (5, 6). However, it should be 75 
noted that there are uncertainties as to the relationship between molecularly 76 
detected virus and infectious virus. In terms of persistence, there appears to be 77 
similarity between SARS-CoV-1 and 2 on surfaces, where initial concentrations of 103.7 78 
Median Tissue Culture Infectious Dose (TCID50)/mL (SARS-CoV-2) and of 103.4 79 
TCID50/mL (SARS-1) reduced to 100.6 TCID50/mL (SARS-CoV-2) and 100.7 TCID50/mL 80 
(SARS-1) respectively due to decay of viability of the virus after 72 hours on plastic 81 
surfaces (7). Persistence on the scale of days under heavy contamination conditions 82 
allows an opportunity for exposure through hand-to-fomite contacts. Although 83 
personal protective equipment (PPE) such as gloves, gowns, and masks are worn to 84 
protect both patient and healthcare worker (HCW) from exposure, self-85 
contamination during PPE doffing processes (8, 9) poses risks to HCW and enables 86 
spread from one patient to another during multiple care episodes. SARS-CoV-2 has 87 
been detected on healthcare worker PPE (10) and in the environment of rooms 88 
where doffing occurs, demonstrating that errors in doffing could facilitate COVID-19 89 
exposure and transmission.  90 
While SARS-CoV-2 has been detected on PPE and patient surfaces, the 91 







unknown(11). Bullard et al. (2020) presents TCID50 and cycle threshold values relative 93 
to days since symptom onset, but these may not be translatable to concentrations 94 
on fomites due to the potential for more SARS-CoV-2 genetic material 95 
corresponding to inactivated viruses resulting from incomplete surface disinfection 96 
practices (12). Quantitative microbial risk assessments (QMRA) involve the use of 97 
mathematical models to estimate doses of a pathogen and subsequent infection 98 
risk probabilities. Quantifying infection exposure and risk for any given dose can be 99 
used to guide intervention decision-making and have been used in other public 100 
health contexts, such as in setting water quality standards (13). These typically rely 101 
on experimental doses of a microorganism inoculated into healthy participants or 102 
mice models in a known quantity. Whether they develop the infection can then be 103 
recorded(13). QMRA modelling and surface contact models have been used to 104 
evaluate multiple transmission pathways. The role of care-specific behaviours in 105 
environmental microbial spread (14) includes the effect of glove use in bacterial 106 
spread from one surface to another (15) and evaluating risk reductions through 107 
hand hygiene or surface disinfection interventions (16–18). While a strength of QMRA 108 
is relating environmental monitoring data to health outcomes, a common limitation 109 
has been a lack of specific human behaviour data such as hand-to-face or hand-110 
to-surface contact sequences that result in dose exposures (18, 19). The use of the 111 
QMRA modelling framework incorporating care type surface contact patterns 112 
before potential self-contamination via PPE doffing will offer insight into viral 113 
exposure  per shift. 114 
The objective of this study is to relate SARS-CoV-2 concentrations on surfaces to 115 







the effects of doffing mistakes and number of care episodes per shift on inoculated 117 
dose per shift. 118 
Methodology 119 
This approach combines human behaviour and fomite-mediated exposure 120 
models for 19 hospital scenarios, for which concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 on hands 121 
and infection risk for a single shift are estimated for a registered nurse, an auxiliary 122 
nurse and a doctor. A control scenario was defined as a single episode of care with 123 
a SARS-CoV-2 positive individual with an assumed 80% probability of self-124 
contamination during doffing: a “worst case scenario.” Eighteen other scenarios 125 
covered 3 likelihoods of self-contamination: 10%, 50%, and 80%, x 2 case load 126 
conditions: 7 patients (low) vs. 14 patients (high) x 3 probabilities of any given patient 127 
being COVID-19 positive: low (5%), medium(50%), and a 100% COVID-19 positive 128 
ward. These rates of self-contamination during doffing were assumed due to 129 
uncertainty as to how workload and stress, especially under pandemic conditions, 130 
would influence doffing. Exploring probabilities of self-contamination as low as 5% 131 
and as high as 80% allows for exploration of optimistic and worse case scenarios.  132 
During low case load conditions, it was assumed that the number of care 133 
episodes per shift would be less (7)  than for high load conditions (14). The assumed 134 
number of patient care episodes when PPE is worn per shift for low and high case 135 
load scenarios were 7 and 14, respectively, based on a respiratory ward in a 136 
university teaching hospital in the UK. The low case load estimate was based on 137 
communication with a UK NHS consultant, who tracked the number of gowns used 138 
by healthcare workers over a week on a mixed COVID-19 8-bed respiratory ward. All 139 







simulations were run where sequences of hand-surface contacts per care episode 141 
were care-specific (IV care, observational care, or doctors’ rounds).  142 
Table 1. Model parameters and their distributions/point values 143 
Parameter Distribution/Point Value Reference 
Surface contamination (!!"#) 
(RNA/ swabbed surface area) 
For infected patient scenarios 
 
Surfaces: 
Triangular (min=3.3 x 103, mid=2.8 x 104, max=6.6 x 104) 
 
Patient: 
Point estimate: 3.3 x 103 
 
(20) 
Area of any given 
surface("$%&'()*) 
(cm2) 
Triangular (min=5, max=195, mid=100) Assumed 
Fraction of RNA(infective)  
assumed to be infectious 




Normal (mean=0.118, sd=0.088) 





Normal (mean=0.123, sd=0.068) 





Normal (mean=0.339, sd=0.1318) 





Uniform (min=3 x 10-7, max=0.1) (8) 
T99 on Hands 





T50 on surfaces 





Hand hygiene efficacy: 
alcohol gel (log10 reduction) 
Uniform (min=2, max=4) (24) 
Hand hygiene efficacy: soap 
and water (log10 reduction) 
Normal (mean=1.62, sd=0.12) 
Left-and right-truncated at 0 and 4, respectively 
(25) 
Fraction of total hand surface 
area for hand-to-mouth or 
hand-to-surface contacts 
(&.and &/) 
For in/out events: 
Uniform (min=0.10, max=0.17) 
 
For patient contacts: 
Uniform (min=0.04, max=0.25) 
 
For other surface contacts: 
Uniform (min=0.008, max=0.25) 
 








Uniform (min=0.008, max=0.012) 
 
Total hand surface area ("/) 
(cm2) 
Uniform (min=445, max=535) (19, 27) 
Dose response curve 
parameter* α 




Dose response curve 
parameter* β 





*Dose response curve parameters are to be used in bootstrapped pairs. Mean ± SD 145 
and minimum and maximum are provided to offer context as to the magnitude of 146 
these parameters.  147 
 148 
Healthcare Worker Surface Contact Behaviour Sequences 149 
Fifty episodes of mock patient care were recorded overtly using videography in 150 
a respiratory ward side room at St James’ Hospital, Leeds. Mock care was 151 
undertaken by doctors and nurses with a volunteer from the research team to 152 
represent the patient.  While these observations were carried out prior to COVID-19, 153 
it is assumed that patient care would be similar for any infected patient, including a 154 
COVID-19 patient.  Ethical approval for the study was given by the NHS Health 155 
Research Authority Research Ethics Committee (London - Queen Square Research 156 
Ethics Committee), REF: 19/LO/0301. Sequences of surface contacts were recorded 157 
for three specific care types: IV drip insertion and subsequent care (IV, n=17) 158 
conducted by registered nurses (RN); blood pressure, temperature and oxygen 159 
saturation measurement (Observations, n=20) conducted by auxiliary nurses; and 160 
doctors’ rounds (Rounds, n=13).  Data from care were used to generate 161 
representative contact patterns to model possible sequences of surface contacts 162 
by HCWs in a single patient room. Discrete Markov chains were used, because 163 
HCWs were found to touch surfaces in a non-random manner, insofar that 164 
transitional probabilities fit to observed behaviours from moving from one surface 165 







from 1 to 5, where Equipment = 1, Patient = 2, Hygiene areas = 3, Near-bed 167 
surfaces = 4, and Far-bed surfaces = 5, HCW sequential contact of surfaces can be 168 
modelled in terms of weighted probabilities(14). More information regarding the 169 
observation of these behaviours and analysis of sequences of events can be seen in 170 
King et al. (2020) (29). 171 
The transition of a HCW between surface contacts is modelled using a discrete-172 
time Markov chain approach (14). Using defined weighted probabilities based on 173 
observation of patient care, surface contact by HCW can be simulated based on 174 
the property that, given the present state, the future and past surfaces touched are 175 
independent. This is termed the Markov property (eq 1): 176 
"($!"# = &|$! = ()      (1) 177 
Where $! represents the surface contacted in the *$% event, & and ( are two 178 
surfaces, and " represents a conditional probability. This is then denoted "&→( for 179 
ease of notation. For example, the probability if the HCW is currently touching the 180 
table that they will next touch the chair is "$)*+,→-%)(. and can be worked out by 181 
counting the number of times this happens during care divided by the number of 182 
times any surface is touched after the table(30).  183 
Discrete-time Markov chains were fitted to observed care contact sequences 184 
using the “markovchainFit” function from the R package markovchain (version 185 
0.7.0). Separate Markov chains were fitted to IV care, doctors’ rounds and 186 
observational care sequences. States included “in” (entrance to the patient room), 187 
“out” (exit from the patient room), contact with a far-patient surface, contact with a 188 
near-patient surface, contact with a hygiene surface (e.g. tap, sink, soap or alcohol 189 







was entrance into the patient room. It was assumed in the simulation that all HCWs 191 
wore a gown, gloves, mask and face shield when entering the room in that hand-to-192 
face contacts were not modeled during episodes of care, and hand hygiene 193 
moments only occurred after doffing in between care episodes. The episode of care 194 
ended when an “out” event occurred.  195 
Exposure Model 196 
Accretion of microorganism on hands from surface contacts has been 197 
demonstrated (14) to respond to a recurrence relationship with the concentration 198 
on hands after the nth contact, +!%, with the concentration on hands, +!/#
% , and on 199 
the surface involved, +!/#
0 , before the contact. See eq. 2. 200 
                           +!% = +!/#
% ,/1!2$ − .%/0+!/#
% ,/1!2$ − 1+!/#
0 ,/1"2$2    (2) 201 
This is an adaptation of the pathogen accretion model (PAM) from King et al. 202 
(2015) (14) and a gradient transfer model by Julian et al. (2009) (31). Here, the 203 
concentration on hands for contact n is equal to the previous concentration on the 204 
hand (+!/#
% ) after adjusting for inactivation for the virus on the hand (3%) and surface 205 
30, minus the removal from the hand due to hand-to-surface transfer plus the gain to 206 
the hand due to surface-to-hand transfer. Δ5 is the time taken for an episode of 207 
patient care and sampled from a uniform distribution of range 2-20minutes(32). 208 
Here, 0 and 1 represent hand-to-surface and surface-to-hand transfer efficiencies 209 
respectively. The fraction of the total hand surface area (.%) is used to estimate how 210 
much virus is available for transfer given a concentration of number of viral 211 
particles/cm2 on the gloved hand and surface. 212 







Sizun et al. (2000) evaluated the survival of human coronaviruses (HCoV) strains 214 
OC43 and 229E on latex glove material after drying. Within six hours, there was a 215 
reduction in viral infectivity for HCoV-229E that we assume is equal to 99% (22). For 216 
HCV-OC43, a reduction of approximately 99% in viral infectivity occurred within an 217 
hour (22). Harbourt et al. measured SARS CoV-2 inactivation on pig skin with virus 218 
remaining viable for up to 8 hours at 37ºC (33). We therefore used a uniform 219 
distribution with a minimum of 1 hour and a maximum of 8 hours to estimate a 220 
distribution of 3% inactivation rates.  221 
Estimating Inactivation on Surfaces 222 
The decay of the virus causing COVID-19 has been shown to vary under both 223 
humidity and temperature but in contrast with previous findings(7), it appears that 224 
surface material may not have as large of an impact on decay rate(34). We 225 
therefore use one distribution of inactivation rates regardless of surface type by 226 
taking a conservative approach and using an averaged half-life 6 estimate for 227 
stainless steel and plastic-coated surfaces at 21-23°C(7) at 40% relative humidity; 228 
which are 5.63h (95%CI=4.59-6.86h), and 6.81h (95%CI=5.62-8.17h), respectively. We 229 
assume a first order decay (eq 3) to estimate inactivation constant	3 which we use 230 
here for brevity instead of 30 and 3% in equation 2. 231 
 232 
+(5) = +3,/1	$	            (3) 233 
Surface viral concentration C at any given time t then depends uniquely on initial 234 
concentration+3 . Where the half-life 6, is related to k by: 30 = log(2) /	6. Since hospital 235 
rooms are made up of a combination of stainless steel and plastic surfaces, we have 236 







distribution for inactivation rate 30. Inactivation on gloves is assumed to be minimal 238 
for the time-scale of a care episode (2-20minutes)(32). 239 
Fractional Surface Area 240 
For contacts with the door handle during “in” or “out” behaviors, a fractional 241 
surface area was randomly sampled from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 242 
0.10 and a maximum of 0.17 for open hand grip hand-to-object contacts (26). For 243 
contacts with the patient, a fractional surface area was randomly sampled from a 244 
uniform distribution with a minimum of 0.04 and a maximum of 0.25, for front partial 245 
finger or full front palm with finger contact configurations (26). For contacts with 246 
other surfaces, fractional surface areas were randomly sampled from a uniform 247 
distribution with a minimum of 0.008 and a maximum of 0.25, spanning multiple 248 
contact and grip types from a single fingertip up to a full palm contact (26). 249 
 250 
Transfer Efficiencies 251 
All transfer efficiencies used in this model are unitless fractions ranging from 0 to 252 
1, representing the fraction of viruses available for transfer that transfer from one 253 
surface to another upon contact. For contacts with surfaces other than the patient, 254 
a truncated normal distribution with a mean of 0.123 and a standard deviation of 255 
0.068 with maximum 1 and minimum 0 was randomly sampled for surface-to-256 
finger(0) transfer efficiencies based on aggregated averages of influenza, rhinovirus 257 
and norovirus(4). For patient contacts, transfer efficiencies were randomly sampled 258 
from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.056 and a standard deviation of 0.032, 259 
left- and right-truncated at 0 and 1, respectively. The mean and standard deviation 260 







contact (35). Transfer efficiencies from fingers to surfaces (1)are assumed to be 262 
normally distributed with mean 0.118 and standard deviation 0.088(4). 263 
Surface Concentrations 264 
If the patient was assumed to be infected, surface contamination levels (RNA/ 265 
swab surface area) were sampled from a triangular distribution where the minimum 266 
and maximum were informed by minimum and maximum contamination levels 267 
reported for surfaces in an intensive care unit ward (20). The median of these was 268 
used to inform the midpoint of the triangular distribution (20). For patient contacts, 269 
the concentration of virus detected on a patient mask was used as a point value 270 
(3.3 x 103RNA/swab surface area) (20). When a patient was not infected, it was 271 
assumed contacts with surfaces and with the patient would not contribute to 272 
additional accretion of virus on gloved hands. 273 
Surface areas for relating concentrations of RNA/swabbed surface area 274 
reported by Guo et al. (2020) to RNA/cm2 were not provided. While a typical 275 
sampling size is 100 cm2, it may be as small as 10-25 cm2 (36–39) and in real-world 276 
scenarios, sampling surface areas may be larger or smaller than these depending 277 
upon available surface area, ease of access and the contamination magnitude 278 
expected.  Since the surface areas of these surfaces were not provided, a triangular 279 
distribution (min=5, max=195, mid=100) describing the surface area (cm2) of surfaces 280 
sampled was used to estimate RNA/cm2. Not all detected RNA was assumed to 281 
represent infectious viral particles. This is a conservative risk approach when utilizing 282 
molecular concentration data in QMRA (40). Therefore, concentrations on surfaces 283 
+5 (viable viral particles/cm2) were estimated by eq 4, 284 
+5 = 6#$%
7"&'()*+







where +897 is the RNA/swabbed surface area, A0:.;)-, is the surface area (cm2) of 286 
the surface, and &*>,?5&@, is the fraction of RNA that relates to infective viral particles 287 
(uniform(min=0.001, max=0.1)). This overlaps with a range used by Jones (2020) for 288 
COVID-19 modeling. While data from Bullard et al. (2020) exist for relating 289 
molecularly detected SARS-CoV-2 to culturable SARS-CoV-2 for patient samples, 290 
these ratios do not translate to fomite scenarios where surface disinfection likely 291 
results in more molecularly detectable virus that does not translate to infectivity. 292 
Therefore, we did not use these data to inform our assumptions about viral infectivity 293 
for molecularly detected SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces. 294 
Estimating Exposure Dose 295 
For all scenarios, it was assumed the starting concentration on gloved hands for 296 
the first episode of care was equal to 0 viral particles/cm2. If gloves were doffed and 297 
a new pair was donned in between care episodes, it was assumed the next episode 298 
of care began with a concentration of 0 viral particles/cm2 on the gloved hands. 299 
After each care episode, a number was randomly sampled from a uniform 300 
distribution with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1. If this value was less than or 301 
equal to the set probability of self-contamination during doffing, self-contamination 302 
occurred, where the fraction of total virus transferred from the outer glove surface to 303 
the hands was assumed to be uniformly distributed between 3 x 10-5 % and 10%  (8). 304 
There was then a 50/50 chance that either hands were washed or sanitized using 305 
alcohol gel due to lack of available data describing proportions of hand hygiene 306 
attributable to these two methods occurring after care episodes. If they washed 307 
their hands, a log10 reduction was randomly sampled from a normal distribution with 308 







these are not coronavirus-specific hand washing efficacies they allow for a 310 
conservative estimate. If hand sanitizer was used, a log10 reduction was randomly 311 
sampled from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 4 (24). 312 
To estimate a dose, an expected concentration on the hands after doffing and 313 
hand hygiene was estimated, followed by an expected transfer to a facial mucosal 314 
membrane during a single hand-to-nose contact after each patient care episode 315 
(eq. 5).  316 
B = +% ⋅ DE<= ⋅ .> ⋅ A% ⋅ ,/1!?$                                 (5) 317 
There was a 50/50 chance that either the right or left hand was used for this 318 
hand-to-face contact, as contact patterns between right and left hands have been 319 
shown to lack statistically significant differences (41). Here, the transfer efficiency 320 
(TH®M) of the hand-to-nose contact was randomly sampled from a normal 321 
distribution with a mean of 33.90%, and a standard deviation of 13.18% based on a 322 
viral surrogate(42). These simulated nose contacts were assumed to be with the 323 
mucosal membrane as opposed to other parts of the nose, such as the bridge of the 324 
nose, that would not result in a dose. The fractional surface area of contact (.>) was 325 
assumed to equal one fingertip. To estimate this surface area, the minimum and 326 
maximum front partial fingertip fractional surface areas were divided by 5 to inform 327 
the minimum and maximum values of a uniform distribution (22). The surface area of 328 
a hand (A%) was randomly sampled from a uniform distribution with a minimum of 329 
445 cm2 and a maximum of 535 cm2 (19) and is informed by values from the 330 
Environmental Protection Agency, USA’s Exposure Factors Handbook (27). The 331 
expected inactivation of virus during this contact assumed a single second contact, 332 







the time between doffing and touching the mucosa. 10,000 parameter 334 
combinations are obtained for each care type scenario in a Monte Carlo 335 
framework. 336 
Dose-Response 337 
Due to lack of dose-response curve data for SARS-CoV-2, an exact beta-338 
Poisson dose-response curve (43) was fitted to pooled data for SARS-CoV-1 and 339 
HCoV 229E, assuming the infectivity of SARS-CoV-2 lies between the infectivity for 340 
these two organisms. In eq 6., 1F1(G, G + 1,−J) is the “Kummer confluent 341 
hypergeometric function” and  "(J) is the probability of infection risk given dose: 342 
J	(eq. 6)	(43). 343 
             "(J) = 1 −1F1(G, G + 1,−J)           (6) 344 
Ten-thousand bootstrapped pairs of G and 1 were produced based on a maximum 345 
likelihood estimation fit. For each estimated dose, an G and 1 pair were randomly 346 
sampled, and an infection risk was estimated with eq. 6. The infectious dose for 50% 347 
of infections to occur was between 5 and 100 infectious viral particles with a mean 348 
of 30; the dose-response curve can be seen in Figure 1. We use this dose-response 349 
curve within the discussion section as a comparator against the curve for HCoV229E 350 








Figure 1 Dose-response risk curve for averaged SARS CoV-1 and Coronavirus 229E response. 353 
 354 
Sensitivity Analysis 355 
Spearman correlation coefficients were used to quantify monotonic 356 
relationships between input variables and viral exposure. This method has been used 357 
in other QMRA studies to evaluate the relationship between model inputs and 358 
outputs (31, 44, 45).  359 
Results 360 
Surface contact pattern predictions varied by care type. IV care resulted in the 361 
highest number of surface contacts (mean=23, sd=10) per episode, whilst 362 
observational care and doctors’ rounds had on average 14 (sd=7) and 20 (sd=6) 363 
contacts, respectively. A stair plot showing an example HCW surface contact 364 
pattern derived from the Markov chain prediction can be seen in Error! Reference 365 








Figure 2 Stair plot of example HCW surface contacts during care, where “patient” is a hand-to-patient 368 
contact; “out” and “in” are exit and entrance into the patient room, respectively; “FarPatient” is a 369 
hand-to-far patient surface contact; and “Equipment” is a hand-to-equipment surface contact. 370 
  371 
Estimated Dose  372 
Dose values in Table 2 and Figure 3 are given in number of virus plaque forming 373 
units (PFU), where we also include all fractional values since these would correspond 374 
to multiple viruses for a higher surface load relating to different SARS CoV2 variants.  375 
Table 2 PFU doses to for each care type 376 
QUANTILE IV CARE OBSERVATIONS DRS' ROUNDS 
0% 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 
50% 0.00184 0.0021 0.00127 
75% 0.0751 0.0651 0.0409 
95% 0.506 0.421 0.234 
 377 
Median PFU values for each care type were within the same order of magnitude 378 







observations and 68% than for Drs’ rounds which can be explained by the number of 380 
surface contacts (IV-drip care: 23±10, Doctors’ rounds: 14±7 and Observational care: 381 
20±6).  Doubling patient load, regardless of COVID-19 prevalence, probability of self 382 
inoculation or care type, caused median viral dose to increase by an order of 383 
magnitude from 0.0004PFUs to 0.0069PFUs (95%CI= 0 to 0.501PFU). Figure 3 shows a 384 
bar chart with standard deviations for care type, COVID-19 prevalence on the ward 385 







  387 
 388 
Figure 3: Bar chart showing viral dose (PFU) per shift for IV, Observations and doctors’ rounds for 389 
different COVID patient loads. Errorbars represent standard deviation of the mean. 390 
 A linear regression of dose on all predictor variables conducted in R (version 391 
4.0.1) shows that dose does not track linearly with COVID-19 prevalence (p<0.001); 392 
where the median dose received during 100% COVID-19 prevalence was an order 393 
of magnitude higher than at 50% (0.008 PFU vs 0.031PFU) and 0PFU after care with a 394 







 Spearman correlation coefficients for input parameters vs viral dose received 396 
are given in Table2. In terms of most important factors determining exposure,  397 
surface cleanliness was found to be the single most important, with hand-to-398 
mouth/eyes/nose transfer efficiency only half as important (correlation coefficient P 399 
= 0.29 vs P = 0.12, respectively) (see Table 3). Surface concentration relates to 400 
cleaning frequency and hence the control case was run for half the surface 401 
bioburden.  402 
Table 3. Spearman correlation coefficients of input parameters with viral dose 403 
Parameter Spearman Correlation Coefficient 
Concentration on surfaces  
(viral particles/cm2) 
0.27 
Transfer efficiency to 
 mouth, eyes, or nose** 
0.08 
Transfer efficiency  
surface to hand 
0.03 
Transfer efficiency  
Hand to surface 
0.01 
Inactivation constant for surfaces -0.02 
Fraction of total hand surface area 
in contact 
-0.02 
Fraction of RNA relating to infectious 
particles* 
0.04 
Fraction of total hand surface area 
used in hand-to-face contact** 
0.03 
Total hand surface area** 0.02 
Inactivation constant for hands 0.02 
 404 
*The spearman correlation coefficient represents instances where contacts with 405 
surfaces that had non-zero concentrations were made 406 
**The spearman correlation coefficient represents instances in which these 407 
parameters were used in a simulation where a contaminated hand-to-face contact 408 
was made after doffing 409 














Key Findings and Generalizability 412 
The model developed in this study indicates that exposure from mistakes after 413 
doffing PPE is likely to be low for a single shift, even for nurses on 100% patient 414 
COVID-19 positive wards. Exposure doses vary by care type as greater frequencies 415 
of surface contacts directly impact on viral loading on gloves and subsequent self-416 
contamination exposures. The dose increases further if error rates in doffing are high 417 
and a high proportion of patients are COVID-19 positive (Figure 3) which highlights 418 
the importance of optimal hand hygiene, especially after PPE doffing. 419 
Surface cleanliness was the most important factor in predicting dose regardless 420 
of doffing mistake likelihood, highlighting the relevance of frequency of cleaning 421 
regimes for managing risk. Halving the surface viral concentration decreased the 422 
exposure 2-fold.  Studies have shown that microorganisms can be readily transferred 423 
between touch sites in a healthcare environment by routine activities(46). Dispersion 424 
of respiratory droplets and aerosols may contaminate less frequently touched 425 
surfaces as well, particularly where the patient is undergoing treatment that 426 
generates aerosols such as continuous positive airway (CPAP) ventilation. Sampling 427 
in COVID-19 wards suggests aerosol deposition is a contributor to surface 428 
contamination, as one study has reported deposition at a distance of 3m from the 429 
patient(11). Previous experimental work aerosolising a bacteria in an air-conditioned 430 
hospital room test-chamber showed that surfaces well outside the patient zone can 431 
become contaminated with infectious material (47, 48). Since the observational 432 
study underlying the Markov chains reveals that at least 10% of staff contacts impact 433 







surfaces(49) that had historically been prioritised for cleaning, may need to be 435 
revised. 436 
A dose-response curve for SARS-CoV-2 is not yet available, and furthermore the 437 
contribution of each dose (i.e., upper respiratory vs lower respiratory route) to 438 
individual infection risk may still be unclear even if and when it is obtained (28). 439 
Consequently, we have analysed the results from the contact model based on 440 
relative exposures and qualitative trends to try and understand the effect of key 441 
parameters and mitigation strategies. In Figure 4 we plot the risk [0-1] for each of the 442 
doses that the nurses receive. We compare the prediction between the Beta 443 
Poisson dose-response curve presented above against that for HCoV229E. We also 444 
follow the approach from Lei et al. and assume that the dose required for infection 445 
from the upper respiratory tract relating to a mucosal contact is 100 times higher 446 
than a dose reaching the lower respiratory tract. 447 
 448 
Figure 4 Boxplot showing Infection risk (i.e., individual probability of infection for each predicted 449 
dose), using the Beta-Poisson and HCoV-229E exponential dose-response curve (28). Triangles 450 







In general, the mean risk is higher than the upper quartile alluding to the 452 
hypothesis that a few nurses may become infected which relates to opportunistic or 453 
rare events under these circumstances. Using a Bernoulli distribution with either a 1 or 454 
a 0 response, representing an infection or not from each one of the predicted 455 
exposure doses and corresponding individual infection risk probabilities, we can 456 
predict the number of nurses infected per 100 nurses. 457 
From the individual risks predicted using the Beta-Poisson curve and under a 458 
baseline assumption of 5% COVID-19 positive patients, 14 care episodes, 10% 459 
chance of self-inoculation we see that 1 nurse is likely to become infected with 460 
another 1 possible based on the mean and standard deviations obtained from 100 461 
Bernoulli simulation runs. Under the worst case scenario which could be roughly 462 
interpreted as an out-of-control epidemic in the community (100% COVID-19 463 
patients, 14 care episodes, 80% chance of self-inoculation), this mean increases to 4 464 
per 100 with a standard deviation of 4 infections.   465 
The results in Figure 4 are illustrative to demonstrate the potential variability in 466 
infection risk that could result from exposures during a shift, but it is important to 467 
recognise that, analysis of infection risk also needs to be interpreted in the context of 468 
the current status of the pandemic within a particular country or region. Emergence 469 
of more transmissible variants are already changing the exposure-risk relationships, 470 
and it is likely that dose-response will be specific to a particular variant. The risk of 471 
infection will also be substantially impacted by the vaccination status within a 472 
community. At the time of writing, 45 million people had received the first vaccine 473 
dose and 34 million the second dose in the UK, which will substantially reduce the 474 








Regardless of the number of COVID-19 positive patients on a ward, notable 477 
decreases in predicted infection risk were associated with less self-contamination 478 
during doffing. For example, for scenarios involving all COVID-19 patients, the mean 479 
infection risk for 10% probability of self-contamination while doffing was 0.4%, while 480 
the mean infection risk for an 80% probability of self-contamination while doffing was 481 
more than a 420% increase at 2.1%. This emphasizes the importance of adequate 482 
training for PPE use. Less risk of self-contamination will decrease transmission risks, 483 
potentially through sanitizing gloves with alcohol gel before doffing. PPE can be an 484 
effective strategy for mitigating exposure if proper doffing techniques are used. In 485 
addition to training, improvements in PPE design that enhance safety and 486 
expediency of doffing may lower self-contamination rates and therefore improve 487 
PPE as a mitigation strategy (50). For example, fasteners or ties on gowns/masks were 488 
identified as “doffing barriers,” because it was unclear whether these were to be 489 
untied and there were difficulties in reaching these ties. Self-contamination due to 490 
gowns and masks were not specifically addressed in this model. It is possible that 491 
self-contamination during doffing of items other than gloves could increase 492 
potential risks due to incorrect doffing. Shortages of PPE have changed normal 493 
practice where PPE is worn on a sessional basis rather than renewed for each 494 
patient. This means less doffing and potentially less auto-contamination but may 495 
increase the risk of virus transfer within the unit. 496 
 In addition to the importance of safe and proper doffing, the results from this 497 
computational study also emphasize the importance of surface decontamination 498 







the most influential parameter on dose, which is consistent with other surface 500 
exposure studies (31). Whilst SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected on surfaces, one 501 
limitation to a molecular approach is the lack of information regarding infectivity. In 502 
a recent study by Zhou et al. (2020), no surface samples demonstrated infectivity. 503 
However, it was noted that the concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 on surfaces were 504 
below the current detection limits for culture methodologies (39). While there are 505 
known relationships between cycle threshold values and probabilities of detecting 506 
viable virus in a sample (12, 51), it is necessary to know what fraction of detected 507 
genome copies relate to viral particles for QMRAs. More data are needed to better 508 
understand how molecular concentrations, even concentrations below detection 509 
limits, relate to infectivity and subsequent infection risk. 510 
Model Uncertainties 511 
The model in this study only evaluates a surface transmission route while in 512 
reality, risks posed to healthcare workers are due combined exposure pathways: air, 513 
droplet, person-to-person, and surface transmission. As the model only evaluates 514 
surface transmission, these infection risks are likely to be an underestimate of the 515 
total risk incurred by healthcare workers over an entire shift. In a study of healthcare 516 
workers in a facility in Wuhan, China, 1.1% (110/9684) were COVID-19 positive (52). 517 
According to CDC, from February 12 – April 9, 2020, 19% (9,282/49,370) of COVID-19 518 
U.S. cases for which healthcare professional status was available, were healthcare 519 
workers (53). However, it is not known how many shifts were associated with these 520 
infection rates. Additionally, we assumed that wards with non-COVID-19 patients did 521 
not have SARS-CoV-2 contamination on surfaces, due to lack of data on SARS-CoV-522 







potential for asymptomatically infected healthcare workers to contribute 524 
environmental contamination, especially when considering the relatively long 525 
shedding durations for asymptomatic infections (54). Infected healthcare workers 526 
and environmental contamination could be considered in future extensions of this 527 
model. 528 
The fact that the proportions of healthcare workers with COVID-19 discussed 529 
above are much larger than the infection risks estimated suggest that other 530 
transmission routes could drive additional HCW cases. This would include more 531 
transmission through airborne routes, or HCW to HCW transmission by asymptomatic 532 
cases outside the COVID-19 care environment (55). However, while there continues 533 
to be disagreement over the contribution of each route to overall risk, transmission 534 
routes influence each other, making them all significant in healthcare environments. 535 
For example, surfaces can become contaminated due to deposition of aerosolized 536 
virus. Viruses can later be resuspended from surfaces, contributing to air 537 
contamination. Future work should extend current models with a multi-exposure 538 
pathway approach. This will advance not only our understanding of SARS-CoV-2 539 
transmission but the transmission of pathogens in built environments as a whole.  540 
 541 
It should be noted that there is still a large variation in gowns and masks and 542 
that there is the possibility of double gloving, hence potentially reducing the risk of 543 
self-contamination and the type of material and the design will also to an extent, 544 
determine the contamination risk. 545 
 546 
Finally, a dose-response curve informed by SARS-CoV-1 and HCoV-229E data 547 







limitations related to dose-response, the conclusions from the estimated doses were 549 
consistent with insights from infection risk estimates. Increases in probability of 550 
contamination between care episodes related to increases in dose and most 551 
notably, for scenarios in which more than 5% of patients had COVID-19 (Figure 3).  552 
Conclusion 553 
We propose a model for predicting exposure to healthcare workers from self-554 
contamination during doffing of personal protective equipment over a single shift. 555 
The model estimates the quantity of SARS-CoV-2 virus accretion on gloved hands for 556 
three types of non-aerosol-generating procedures: IV-care, observations and 557 
doctors’ rounds. Once doffing was in progress, staff self-contaminated a fraction of 558 
the times based on patient-load fatigue. Three COVID-19 positive patient scenarios 559 
(5%, 50% and 100% COVID-19 patients) were investigated amounting to a total of 560 
30,000 parameter combinations allowing us to conduct a “what-if” parametric study 561 
and sensitivity analysis. Surface viral concentration was found to be more than twice 562 
as important as any other factor whereby highlighting the importance of time-563 
appropriate cleaning. Transfer efficiency from finger to nose was of secondary 564 
importance, although hand hygiene following doffing is still highly recommended. 565 
Whilst exposure from this type of self-contamination is low per healthcare worker 566 
shift, this highlights that the procedures, if carried out correctly, are generally safe. It 567 
is accepted that other routes of transmission will play a significant role in infection 568 
propagation. 569 
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Tables: 755 
Table 1. Model parameters and their distributions/point values 756 
Parameter Distribution/Point Value Reference 
Surface contamination (!!"#) 
(RNA/ swabbed surface area) 
For infected patient scenarios 
 
Surfaces: 










Point estimate: 3.3 x 103 
 
Area of any given 
surface("$%&'()*) 
(cm2) 
Triangular (min=5, max=195, mid=100) Assumed 
Fraction of RNA(infective)  
assumed to be infectious 




Normal (mean=0.118, sd=0.088) 





Normal (mean=0.123, sd=0.068) 





Normal (mean=0.339, sd=0.1318) 





Uniform (min=3 x 10-7, max=0.1) (8) 
T99 on Hands 





T50 on surfaces 





Hand hygiene efficacy: 
alcohol gel (log10 reduction) 
Uniform (min=2, max=4) (24) 
Hand hygiene efficacy: soap 
and water (log10 reduction) 
Normal (mean=1.62, sd=0.12) 
Left-and right-truncated at 0 and 4, respectively 
(25) 
Fraction of total hand surface 
area for hand-to-mouth or 
hand-to-surface contacts 
(&.and &/) 
For in/out events: 
Uniform (min=0.10, max=0.17) 
 
For patient contacts: 
Uniform (min=0.04, max=0.25) 
 
For other surface contacts: 
Uniform (min=0.008, max=0.25) 
 
For hand-to-face contacts: 
Uniform (min=0.008, max=0.012) 
 
(26) 
Total hand surface area ("/) 
(cm2) 
Uniform (min=445, max=535) (19, 27) 
Dose response curve 
parameter* α 




Dose response curve 
parameter* β 











*Dose response curve parameters are to be used in bootstrapped pairs. Mean ± SD 758 
and minimum and maximum are provided to offer context as to the magnitude of 759 
these parameters.  760 
 761 







Table 2 PFU doses to for each care type 763 
QUANTILE IV CARE OBSERVATIONS DRS ROUNDS 
0% 0 0 0 
25% 0 0 0 
50% 0.00184 0.0021 0.00127 
75% 0.0751 0.0651 0.0409 
95% 0.506 0.421 0.234 
 764 








Table 3. Spearman correlation coefficients of input parameters with infection risk 767 
Parameter Spearman Correlation Coefficient 
Concentration on surfaces  
(viral particles/cm2) 
0.27 
Transfer efficiency to 
 mouth, eyes, or nose** 
0.08 
Transfer efficiency  
surface to hand 
0.03 
Transfer efficiency  
Hand to surface 
0.01 
Inactivation constant for surfaces -0.02 
Fraction of total hand surface area 
in contact 
-0.02 
Fraction of RNA relating to infectious 
particles* 
0.04 
Fraction of total hand surface area 
used in hand-to-face contact** 
0.03 
Total hand surface area** 0.02 
Inactivation constant for hands 0.02 
 768 
*The spearman correlation coefficient represents instances where contacts with 769 
surfaces that had non-zero concentrations were made 770 
**The spearman correlation coefficient represents instances in which these 771 
parameters were used in a simulation where a contaminated hand-to-face contact 772 












Figure captions 779 
 780 
Figure 5 Dose-response risk curve for averaged SARS CoV-1 and Coronavirus 229E response. 781 
Figure 6 Stair plot of example HCW surface contacts during care, where “patient” is a hand-to-patient 782 
contact; “out” and “in” are exit and entrance into the patient room, respectively; “FarPatient” is a 783 
hand-to-far patient surface contact; and “Equipment” is a hand-to-equipment surface contact. 784 
Figure 7: Bar chart showing dose per shift for IV, Observations and doctors’ rounds for different COVID 785 
patient loads. Errorbars represent standard deviation of the mean. 786 
Figure 8 Boxplot showing Infection risk (i.e., individual probability of infection for each predicted 787 
dose), using the Beta-Poisson and HCoV-229E exponential dose-response curve (28). Triangles 788 
represent mean values. 789 
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